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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
-vs- ] 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
i Case No. 940450-CA 
) Case Type: APPEAL 
1 Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Defendant/Appellant, David Craig Carlsen, pursuant to 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, does hereby 
respectfully submits the following Petition for Rehearing. 
The granting of this petition seems compelling in light 
of the following points and issues: 
Point 1. This Court overlooked or misapprehended the 
substantial impact of the numerous errors in the trial court's 
written Judgment and Sentence. 
Point 2. This Court overlooked or misapprehended the lack 
of any statutory or other authority on the part of the trial 
court to set aside the conviction for the offense of Assault 
upon a Peace Officer and entering Judgment and imposing Sentence 
for the offense of Simple Assault. 
DISCUSSION OF POINT I 
Point 1. This Court overlooked or misapprehended the 
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substantial impact of the numerous errors in the trial court's 
written Judgment and Sentence. 
This Court in State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 
1990) at 797 P.2d 1115 observed: 
At common law, the judgment in a criminal case was 
usually nothing more than the oral declaration of guilt 
and sentence, pronounced while a clerk took notes. The 
practice of rendering oral judgments in criminal cases 
has persisted to this day in many courts, including 
apparently many of the Utah circuit courts, despite 
sound reasons opposing its continuation. Those reasons 
include the following: (1) entry of a time-stamped, 
written judgment fixes clearly on the record the date of 
the judgment, thereby simplifying the question of when 
the time begins to run for post-trial motions, filing 
notice of appeal, and for any probation ordered; (2) a 
written in proper form is clear evidence of the defendant's 
conviction in later proceedings; (3) a written judgment 
signed by the judge helps assure the absence of clerical 
error or misunderstanding in the record and shows that 
responsibility for the judgments rests on the shoulders 
of the judge; and (4) it provides at least the beginning 
of a basis for meaningful review of the judgment. 
The written Judgment and Sentence in the instant case was 
signed by Circuit Court Judge, Alfred C. Van Wagenen after this 
Court's decision in Anderson. Anderson, clearly places any 
errors in the written Judgment upon the shoulders of the trial 
judge who signs the Judgment. The written Judgment and Sentence 
in the instant case under this Court's decision in Anderson is 
clear evidence of the four convictions which the written judgment 
shows in any subsequent proceedings against the Defendant where 
a jury, being citizens of ordinary intelligence in reviewing the 
written Judgment and Sentence would in fact conclude that the 
Defendant had been convicted of one count of Simple Assault; 
one count of Assault upon a Peace Officer; and two counts of 
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Interference with an Arrest by a Peace Officer. The written 
Judgment and Sentence in the instant case does not show that 
the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer was reduced by the 
Court to the offense of Simple Assault as represented by the 
Logan City Prosecutor in his Brief before this Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 
1388, 1389 (Utah 1988) observed: 
The trial court may correct clerical mistakes in 
judgments at any time, with or without notice as the 
court may order. Utah R.Crim.P. 30(b). A clerical 
error, as contradistinguished from judicial error, is 
not "the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial 
reasoning and determination." 
The written Judgment and Sentence in this case was signed 
by Judge Alfred C. Van Wagenen, who thereafter refused to 
correct the errors in the written Judgment by denying the 
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentences in the written 
Judgment. The errors in the written Judgment in this case are 
not clerical errors, but judicial errors because the errors are 
the deliberate result of the exercise of judicial reasoning 
and deliberation by Judge Alfred C. Van Wagenen signing the 
written Judgment and thereafter refusing to correct the 
errors in the written judgment. 
The written Judgment does impose illegal sentences or 
sentences imposed in an illegal manner because the written 
Judgment imposes sentences for offenses of which there was a 
total lack of any prior notice and hearing, and the trial court 
did error in denying the Defendant's Motion to Correct the 
Sentence under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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DISCUSSION OF POINT II. 
Point 2. This Court overlooked or misapprehended the 
lack of any statutory or other authority on the part of the 
trial court to set aside the jury verdict for the offense 
of Assault upon a Peace Officer and entering Judgment and 
imposing Sentence for the offense of Simple Assault. 
The Defendant contends that this Court overlooked or 
misapprehended that the Circuit Court is a statutory created 
court which lacked any statutory authority or other authority 
to set aside the jury verdict for the offense of Assault upon 
a Peace Officer and entering Judgment and imposing Sentence 
for the offense of Simple Assault. 
The pertinent part of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5), 
(1974 Amendment) provides as follows: 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, 
shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for the offense charged but that 
there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily 
found every fact required for conviction of that included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set 
aside or reversed an a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, 
if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
"Emphasis Added." 
The statutory provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) 
specifically confers authority upon the district court and 
appellate courts of the State of Utah, jurisdiction to invoke 
the provisions of that statute and to set aside a conviction and 
to enter judgment of an included offense. 
The statutory provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) 
does not confer any authority or jurisdiction upon any Circuit 
Court or Justice Court Judge, any authority to set aside a 
conviction for one offense and to enter judgment for an included 
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offense. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Bindrup, 
655 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982); and State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 
1214 (Utah 1985) where the statutory provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(5) was invoked did involve felony murder cases 
on appeal from the District Courts of the State of Utah and not 
an appeal from a Circuit Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Dunn/ 850 
P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) involved the issue of the inherent power 
of the Utah Supreme Court, a Constitutionally created court to 
set aside a conviction for error and to enter a judgment of guilt 
to a lesser included offense. The case did not involve the 
power of a Circuit Court/ a statutory created court to set aside 
a conviction for one offense and to enter judgment to a lesser 
offense. 
Secondly, the trial court in the instant case did not invoke 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) when the Court 
set aside the conviction for the offense of Assault upon a Peace 
Officer and entered judgment and imposed sentence for the offense 
of Simple Assault/ and such relief was not sought by the defendant 
as is clearly evident by the Sentencing Transcript. 
The State concedes in its brief before this Court that the 
trial judge in this case lacked such authority. 
The trial court setting aside the Defendant's conviction and 
the jury verdict for the offense of Assault upon a Peace Officer 
on grounds that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient 
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to sustain the conviction for the offense as charged in the 
Information which constitutes an acquittal. State v. Jackson/ 
857 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993). 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court 
setting aside the jury verdict in this case for the offense 
of Assault upon a Peace Officer on grounds of insufficient 
evidence adduced at trial constitutes an arrest in judgment 
under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. It would 
be the State who has failed to appeal from the Order Arresting 
Judgment in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18a-l(2)(b), (1990 Amendment), and not the Defendant's 
failure to appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, it would appear that this 
Honorable Court may have overlooked or misapprehended the 
substantial issues raised by the Defendant/Appellant in his 
Brief on Appeal. The Defendant respectfully submits that the 
granting of this petition seem compelling in light of the 
foregoing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this ZJ day of August, 1995. 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSE]^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
The Defendant/Appellant certifies that this Petition is 
submitted in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
-7, ^ 
DATED this O day of August, 1995, 
^ 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN ^ ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the 
roing PETITION FOR REHEARING, postage prep; 
listed below on this n day of August, 1995: 
foregoi paid to the following 
Donald G. Linton 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
D CRAIG CARLSEN (/ u 
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FIRST CIRCUIT COURT - LOGAN c 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
CARLSEN, DAVID CRAIG CASE NO: 911000628 
316 S. MAIN DOB: 03/05/49 
LOGAN UT 84321 TAPE: 91457 COUNT: 1 
DATE: 11/15/91 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 76-5-102 SIMPLE ASLT 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: "Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 1075.00 Susp: 700.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 180 DA ACS: 0 
Charge: 76-8-305 INTERF IN ARREST BY P/O 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Jury 
Fine: 1075.00 Susp: 700.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 180 DA ACS: 0 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: FINE,FEE,FORF.-STATE 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 750.00 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 750.00 
PROBATION AGENCIES; 
Agency Name: FIRST CIRCUIT COURT 
Agency Address: 140 NORTH 100 WEST 
Agency Address: 
City/State/Zip: LOGAN UT 84321 
Phone: (801) 752-6893 
PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS: 
VIOLATE NO LAWS 
DEF ON INFORMAL COURT PROBATION 
DEF TO PAY FINES @ RATE OF $100/MO BEGIN 12/5 
CALENDAR; 
SENTENCING 11/15/91 01:30 PM in rm 2 with CLINT S JUDKINS 
CARLSEN, DAVID CRAIG CASE NO: 911000 628 PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Sentence: 
Deft present w/o Counsel, 
TAPE: 
Judge: 
Chrg: 
Chrg: 
91457 
ASLT ON P.O. 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 180 DAYS 
INTERF ARREST PO 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 180 DAYS 
Prosecutor present 
PRO: SCOTT WYATT 
COUNT: 1 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: 
1075.00 Suspended: 
Suspended: 180 DAYS 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: 
1075.00 Suspended: 
Suspended: 180 DAYS 
Guilty - Ju 
700.00 
Guilty - Ju 
700.00 
BY THE COURT 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
'cu.. ilk 
CIRCUIT COURT 
*&£rl 
LOGAN DISTRICT 
JUL 12 2 26 Pfl 'S'j 
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
P.O. Box 148 
Logan, Utah 84323-0148 
Telephone: (801) 752-8162 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE 
Case No. 911000628 
The above-entitled matter coming on for hearing in this 
Court on the 10th day of May, 1994 on Defendant's Motion to Correct 
the Sentence. The Plaintiff appearing and being represented by 
Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt. The Defendant appearing in 
person and not represented by counsel. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED for good cause appearing that the 
Defendant's Motion to Correct the Sentence and the written Judgment 
previously signed by this Court is hereby denied. 
DATED this 
# 
.day of 1994 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Craig Carlsen, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
JUL 1 3 1995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 940450-CA 
F I L E D 
( J u l y 1 3 , 1995) 
First Circuit, Logan Department 
The Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen 
Attorneys: David Craig Carlsen, Logan, Appellant Pro Se 
Donald G. Linton, Logan, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Billings, and Jackson. 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant David Craig Carlsen appeals from the denial of a 
motion to correct sentence.1 Appellant was convicted by a jury 
of assault on a peace officer, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1995) and interference 
with an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995).2 The trial court set aside the 
jury verdict of assault on a peace officer and entered a 
conviction for assault. The court ruled as a matter of law that 
the officer "was not acting within the scope of his authority as 
a peace officer at the time he was assaulted by the defendant." 
The trial court concluded that the jury had found all of the 
necessary elements of assault, a lesser included offense. 
1. Appellants appeal from the underlying conviction (Case No. 
920305-CA) was dismissed for failure to prosecute. This appeal 
is taken from the order denying defendant's motion to correct 
sentence entered by the trial court on July 19, 1994. 
2. Appellant also contends that a discrepancy in the description 
of his convictions within the judgment of conviction rendered the 
sentence illegal. The error is a mere clerical error and does 
not render the sentence illegal. 
A trial court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
State v. Montova, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991). "Once a 
court imposes u valid sentence, it loses subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case." Id* Our inquiry is thus limited to 
determining whether the trial court legally sentenced appellant 
and thus correctly denied the motion to correct illegal sentence. 
The trial court characterized its sentencing decision as a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellant contends that Rule 50 
conflicts with Rule 2 3 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal under the 
latter rule. We disagree. Regardless of how the trial court 
characterized its decision, the determination actually resulted 
in an arrest of the jury's verdict. "[A] trial court may arrest 
a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element." 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). The trial court 
concluded that the evidertc'e was insufficient to prove only the 
element that the assault occurred at a time when the officer was 
acting within the scope of his authority. The jury was 
instructed on the elements of assault on a peace officer and 
assault and was also instructed that assault was a lesser 
included offense. The sentence for the lesser included offense 
was not an illegal sentence. We affirm the denial of the motion 
to correct illegal sentence. 
Appellant's contention that the court's sentence denied him 
the opportunity to raise defenses unavailable under State v. 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) is without merit since that 
case involved a charge of interference with a police officer 
seeking to effect an arrest. The jury verdict on that offense 
was unaffected by the trial court's decision. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Ndrman H. Jackscjyf, Judge 
940450-CA 2 
76-1-402, Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
thprpirr nr 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-402 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. another statute, § 76-6-704. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2. Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense, 
Cross-References. — Computer Crimes Act Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const., 
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating Amend. V; § 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ecution has met its burden of proof on the 
elements of the greater offense and there is no 
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense; 
however, if there be any evidence, however 
slight, on any reasonable theory of the case 
under which defendant might be convicted of 
the lesser included offense, the trial court must, 
if requested, give an appropriate instruction on 
the lesser included offense. State v. Chesnut, 
621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980). 
Trial court may give a lesser included offense 
instruction, even over a defendant's objection, if 
warranted by the evidence and if there is 
clearly no risk that the defendant will be preju-
diced by lack of notice and preparation so as to 
deprive him of a full and fair opportunity to 
defend himself State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91 
(Utah 1982] 
Although lesser offense must be necessarily 
included within charged offense in order to 
warrant prosecutor's request for lesser in-
cluded offense instructions, a National basis" 
• A P * »f o i l t n o t i c r o n n i raA iirVinr* i r» c 11-11 •»+i/-»n I C ai 
ANALYSIS 
"Act." 
Instructions. 
Jurisdiction of appellate court. 
—Judgment Entered for included offense. 
Jurisdiction of a single court. 
Lesser included offense. 
—Aggravated assault. 
—Aggravated robbery. 
—Joy riding. 
—Manslaughter. 
—Negligent homicide. 
—Possession of stolen vehicle. 
—Theft. 
Misdemeanor and felony charges. 
Multiple predicate offenses. 
Separate offenses. 
—Attempted homicide. 
—Automobile violations. 
— Burglary and larceny. 
— Burglary and theft. 
—Felonv murder. 
77-18a-l UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 18a 
THE APPEAL 
Section 
77-18a-1. Appeals — When proper. 
77-18a-2. Capital cases. 
77-18a-1. Appeals — When proper, 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review th§ appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l. enacted by L. Rules of Criminal Procedure. For notes to cases 
1990, ch. 7, § 10. construing that rule, see the Court Rules vol-
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter ume. 
recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 7, § 12 
Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah makes the act effective on July 1, 1990. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS crime because the defendant, a general part-
ner, could not have committed theft by taking 
In general. partnership property. Although the trial 
Arrest of judgment. court's order was also labeled an acquittal, the 
Dismissal. order was not based on a finding of insufficient 
In general. evidence. Thus, the state had a right to appeal. 
To determine whether an appeal falls within State v. Larsen, 188 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. 
one of the enumerated grounds, the appellate App. 1992). 
court looks to the substance of the ruling and "Dismissal " 
not to the label attached by a trial judge. State , i r, ' . , . , 
v. Workman. 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App.), When a ™otion to suppress evidence is re-
cert, granted, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991) " ^ f ^ 0 ™ ! c l°S m f g . "V™*** a n d l s 
° granted, the order granting the motion is an 
Arrest of judgment acquittal and not a "dismissal" as that term is 
A trial court's ruling was an arrest of judg- used in this section and Utah R. Crim. P. 
ment and not an acquittal where the trial court 26(3)(a), and is not subject to appeal by the 
found that the facts proved did not constitute a state. State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189 (Utah Ct. 
228 
